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Abstract 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) has become an important asset in the lives of 
civilians and defense organizations.  GPS uses include positioning, navigation, timing, as 
well as many other daily applications.  With such dependence, protection against attacks 
on the system is paramount to continue its effectiveness.  Attacks on its signal is the 
easiest way for enemies to degrade and harm not only everyday functioning for civilians, 
but a nation’s defense as well.  Jamming interference and spoofing are the two most 
frequent attacks on GPS signals.  Could these two attacks cause significant effect on 
military operations?  We use a System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS) model 
to emulate a special operation force (SOF) using GPS recovering a weapon of mass 
destruction (WMD) against an opposing military in an urban canyon environment.  
Simulating jamming (modeled as availability and accuracy) and spoofing (modeled as 
timeliness) of the GPS satellites’ signal produces a greater understanding of its impact on 
this type of operation.  Statistical analysis determined the significance of these types of 
attacks on several responses for this simulation.  Our results include a designed 
experiment capturing how individual model factors representing spoofing and jamming 
can degrade GPS performance, and the subsequent impact on mission operations through 
selected MOEs for the scenario modeled. 
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STATISTICAL OBSERVATIONS OF POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND 
TIMING IN A COMBAT SIMULATION 
I.  Introduction 
Imagine a situation where a well-placed smart bomb could end a bloody and 
expensive conflict.  The target is placed near a civilian structure where a miss could cause 
serious non-combatant damage resulting in moral and political fallout.  Spoofing and 
jamming of Global Positioning System (GPS) signals could relegate the smart bomb to an 
inelegant piece of shrapnel without regard for location or consequences. 
GPS has become as important as any functioning system used today.  With many 
uses, it has become irreplaceable for civilian to military users alike. 
1.1 Background of the Study 
The GPS is broken down into three components: space, control, and user.  The space 
portion is made up of 32 operational satellites.  The US has a consensus effort to maintain 
at least 24 operational GPS satellites, 95% of the time.  These satellites orbit in the 
medium Earth orbit (MEO) circling Earth twice a day.  [1] 
The next component is the control component.  This component is broken down into 
the Master Control Station (MCS), the monitor stations, and the ground antennas.  The 
MCS, placed at Colorado Springs, CO, is the central control node for the GPS satellite 
constellation.  It is responsible for all parts of constellation command and control.  The 
monitor stations, located around the world, continuously collect GPS data, which is then 
routed back to the MCS and merged with other parameters to generate the Navigation 
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Message.  Each satellite is seen from at least three monitor stations, allowing for 
improved system accuracy.  The final portion of the control component is the ground 
antennas.  They uplink satellite orbits (ephemerides) and clock correction information 
within the Navigation Message and command telemetry from the MCS back to the 
satellites.  The information is updated at least daily.  [2] 
For this study, attacks against GPS are limited to spoofing and jamming.  These 
attacks target GPS codes, Coarse/Acquisition (C/A) code for civilians, and the restricted 
Precision (P) code for military usage.  It is easier to attack the C/A code (1023 bits long) 
with its 1.023 Mbit/s repeating every millisecond compared to the P code (6.1871 x 1012 
bits long) with its 10.23 Mbit/s repeating once a week.  [3] 
Spoofing is misleading the receiver with fake signals for positioning calculations, 
which result in an increase in measured distance.  There are three classifications of 
spoofing attacks.  The most basic is the simplistic spoof.  This uses a GPS signal 
simulator and transmitter to overload another GPS receiver with the original and spoofed 
signal.  The intermediate spoof synchronizes a generated GPS signal with current GPS 
broadcast satellite signals in view [4].  It attacks each channel of the receiver and forces 
the tracking loops to lock on to the spoofed signals.  Sophisticated spoofing, using 
multiple transmitting antennas, spoofs the current broadcast satellites in addition to 
spoofing other spoofers’ signals.  [5] 
The easier of the two attacks due to the weak power of GPS signals is jamming 
interference.  Jamming interference is comprised of impulse train, single and multi-tone 
Continuous Wave (CW), frequency-hop and linear chirp CW.  Its main purpose is to 
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prevent the receiving and/or sending of signals.  A signal jammer sends a noisy signal on 
the same frequency to the targeted GPS unit preventing transfer of information. 
1.2 Problem Definition 
GPS is such an important aspect of the daily lives of not only civilians, but also more 
for military personnel, attacks against its infrastructure could cause catastrophic damage 
against not only the user, but others as well.  This paper studies the impact of GPS 
manipulation caused by jamming and spoofing methods with the aid of computer 
simulation.  The objective of the study is to answer the following questions: 
• What has a higher effect on a GPS mission, jamming or spoofing? 
• Can a predictive model be established for Measures of Effectiveness? 
1.3 Scope 
Simulation is the tool used for this research.  To answer the problem definition, an 
established model used to observe PNT is utilized.  This model uses the System 
Effectiveness and Analysis Simulation (SEAS) pitting a blue force versus a red force.  
Data retrieved from this scenario is analyzed using statistical techniques to determine the 
answers to the problem definition.   
1.4 Thesis Overview 
The following chapters are the Literature Review, Methodology, Analysis, and 
Conclusions.  The Literature Review discusses related studies about GPS, spoofing, 
jamming, and simulation.  The Methodology chapter discusses the analysis technique that 
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is employed.  The simulation model in detail and the statistical approaches that are used 
for better understanding the model.  Chapter 4 presents the data obtained from running 
the simulation using the statistical method of Design of Experiments method.  It looks to 
answer the questions posed in the problem definition.  The final chapter looks to 
conclude the work by summarizing the methodology and analysis.  It also recommends 
improvements and future research opportunities. 
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II.  Review of Related Studies and Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief background from open source material on spoofing, 
jamming, simulation, and statistical design of experiments as they apply to the modeling 
and analysis of the U.S. NAVSTAR system.  We also discuss the combat modeling 
simulation tool selected for this research along with some related studies and conclude 
with an introduction to the combat scenario we are studying. 
2.2 Global Positioning System (GPS) 
NAVSTAR GPS provides positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) through a 32 
linked satellite system flying in six equally spaced medium Earth orbit (MEO) orbital 
planes circling the Earth twice a day.  The system is broken into three components, space, 
control, and user.   
The United States Air Force (USAF), with a commitment that 95% of the time there 
are at minimum 24 operational GPS satellites, develops, maintains, and operates the 
space component constellation.  The solar powered satellites orbit at approximately 
12,550 miles reaching speeds of 7,000 mph.  The orbital planes housing the GPS 
satellites contain four seats occupying baseline satellites.  When three satellites are 
“seen” by a GPS receiver, a 2D position (latitude and longitude) can be determined.  
With four satellites, a 3D position (2D plus altitude) can be determined. 
The control component is described as “a global network of ground facilities that 
track the GPS satellites, monitor their transmissions, perform analyses, and send 
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commands and data to the constellation [1].” Figure 1 shows the current operational 
control component. 
 
Figure 1.  Control Component [1] 
The master control station (MCS) and alternate MCS provide command and control 
of the system.  They send and receive navigation messages, assess and preserve health 
and accuracy of the satellite constellation, and reposition satellites to uphold an optimal 
GPS constellation.  The 16 monitoring stations track and collect atmospheric data, 
range/carrier measurements, and navigation signals on the satellites and route this 
information back to the MCS.  The four ground antennas transmit command and control 
to the satellites.  The ground antennas are responsible for navigation data and processor 
program uploads/retrievals, telemetry collection, command transmissions, anomaly 
resolution, and early orbit support. 
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Military GPS and Civilian GPS differ in two areas.  The first is in terms of enhanced 
security and jamming resistance.  The second area is the type of service.  Standard 
Positioning Service (SPS) is for civilian usage.  SPS broadcasts on one frequency and is 
able to pinpoint an object to within 330 feet.  Higher quality SPS receivers with the 
combination of augmentation systems are able to provide better than 11.5 feet horizontal 
accuracy.  Military uses Precise Positioning Service (PPS), which is encoded and 
scrambled for security reasons.  PPS broadcasts on two frequencies allowing for a 
reduction in radio degradation allowing for an accuracy within 3 feet.  Security and 
jamming resistance will always be a staple of military GPS, but ongoing modernization 
of the GPS is reducing the service accuracy gap between civilian and military. 
Transmitter power for a satellite is only 50 watts or less.  This is a huge factor in the 
limitation and susceptibility of the system.  With this low power atmospheric effect, sky 
blockage, and receiver quality account for a few of the sources of GPS signal errors [1]. 
2.3 GPS Spoofing 
GPS spoofing uses a signal to take over a GPS receiver.  The signal then causes the 
receiver to deliver false information on the true position of the receiver as dictated by the 
attacker.  Cavaleri remarks that “spoofing is more deceitful” due to the ability of the 
attack to be unrecognizable which leads to false information being fed to the user [6]. 
Spoofing is divided into three categories, simple, intermediate, and sophisticated.  
Figure 2 visually describes the differences between the three categories.   
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Figure 2.  Spoofing Categories [7]  
Figure 3 shows the effect of an intermediate attack. 
 
Figure 3.  Intermediate Spoofing Attack [7] 
 
Spoofing is effective since the victim is normally unaware of the present attack.  This 
leads to there being no true countermeasures for spoofing because of its unassuming 
effects.  There has been study of an in-line RF device connecting to a GPS antenna, 
which provides spoofing protection without upgrades to a legacy receiver.  Signal quality 
and autonomous integrity monitoring help in the detection and mitigation of spoofing [5].  
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Simple and cost effective countermeasures can be retrofitted on nearly all existing GPS 
receivers, although this will not truly eliminate spoofing attacks [8].  This fact is 
worrisome, but it also helps in understanding the spoofing attack itself.  A successful 
spoofing attack needs only a target for most assaults.  A means of prevention understands 
the requirements for a successful attack.  Locations and precision for an infinite amount 
of receivers being spoofed to a random location or even a satellite-lock takeover can be 
identified based on whether the target is civilian or military [9].  This makes it a key 
variable to study when evaluating GPS attacks. 
2.4 GPS Jamming 
GPS jamming is the use of a device to block, jam, or interfere with GPS systems 
communications.  The jammer is described as radio frequency transmitters that block or 
interfere with authorized communications. 
Jamming can be done mechanically or electronically.  Various mechanical jamming 
devices are chaffs and corner reflectors.  Chaffs and reflectors, which have the same 
effect come in different shapes, reflect frequencies to produce false navigation solutions. 
The more common jammers are electronic which are primarily barrage, spot, and 
sweep.  Barrage jamming sends noise out to multiple receivers at once.  While it can 
affect more targets, the effect is less pronounced due to the increase in spread.  Sweep 
jamming also affects multiple targets, but not simultaneously.  It shifts from one target to 
the next.  Spot jamming focuses on only one target.  These jamming techniques can be 
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upgraded to other types of jamming such as base jamming, which is barrage jamming at 
one radar attacking all of its frequencies. 
Countermeasures are used to combat jamming.  These are more widely known due to 
the ease and availability of jammers compared to spoofers.  Countermeasure techniques 
are constantly alternating a frequency used, cloaking outgoing signals with random noise, 
and effective operator training.  [1] 
GPS signals have lower power signals, making them highly susceptible to 
interference by intentional and by unintentional means such as radio transmissions [10].  
This makes it a key variable to study when evaluating GPS attacks. 
2.5 Simulation 
Simulation is a useful tool in running multiple tests without sizeable cost, time, or 
resource impact.  As an example, [4] used simulation to understand the effect of spoofing 
signals by observing the chip delay of a spoofing signal using code and frequency 
tracking as a response.  The steps used for the simulation is to generate an intermediate 
spoofing signal; the spoofers synch the spoofed signal with the current signal; the GPS 
signal receives the spoofing signal and then processes it as the correct signal; and the 
tracking loop error is generated and a “pseudo-range” is established according to the chip 
delay of the spoofing signal.  The navigation solution is then checked to see if it has been 
adversely affected by the spoofing signal.  [4] 
One common analysis technique used with simulation-based analysis is Design of 
Experiments (DOE).  Unlike industrial DOE, simulation DOE does not need to use a 
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fractional design; can generate multiple replications without significant cost; there is no 
need to randomize the runs; and there is greater control over factors within the 
experiment.  [11] 
2.6 Regression/Design of Experiments 
A common experimental design is a 2k design; where there are k factors being 
observed in a low/high setting.  The analysis of this resulting design often leads to a 
regression equation.  The equation can allow for better understanding of the design.  The 
equation becomes a predictive model where significant factors and their coefficients are 
statistically known.  [12] 
Additionally a response surface can be gleaned from the regression equation.  The 
response surface is a geometric figure of the predictive model.  It can show the entire 
surface of a response based on its factors in a design space (often in two-dimensional 
views).  This can be extremely helpful in optimization as well as in understanding a 
process.  [13] 
2.7 SEAS and Related Studies 
With its initial release in 1994, System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS) 
provides “a constructive modeling and simulation tool that enables mission-level Military 
Utility Analysis (MUA)…created to support developmental planning and Pre-Milestone 
“A” acquisition decisions for military space systems. [14]” It provides agent-based 
modeling that can be manipulated with programmable rules within a physics based battle 
environment.  It is currently in use by the Space and Missiles System Center, Air Force 
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Space Command, Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Institute of Technology, 
U.S. Air Force Academy, National Reconnaissance Office, Army Space and Missile 
Defense Command, and Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet within the DoD.  It also is in use 
by DoD contractors to include Lockheed Martin, The Boeing Company, and Northrop 
Grumman.  [14] 
AFIT has done studies using SEAS.  Due to the development of computer networks 
as an integral part of information flow in combat, research is ongoing to gauge the 
effectiveness and efficiency of this domain.  Honaburger [15] uses SEAS to explore 
network centric warfare (NCW) metrics in military worth analysis.  His analysis looks at 
measures that are import to successful NCW in a Kosovo scenario such as target 
detection distance outputs, average communication channel message-loading metrics, and 
target kills to understand better the cognitive domain. 
 Our study uses SMC/XR’s SEAS model [16] to present an urban canyon scenario 
where PNT is highly stressed.  It describes a special operations force (SOF) team trying 
to recover a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) against a red military force.  The team 
uses GPS to lead themselves from an initial drop point to the WMD and back to an 
evacuation point while trying to avoid red forces.  [16] 
2.8 Summary 
GPS is a tool that military and civilian organizations use for a myriad of purposes.  
Beginning with NAVSTAR ran by the USAF, both civilian and militarily share the same 
system from the control component down to the receivers.  Although alike in nearly 
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every area, military application has the advantage of enhanced security and jamming 
resistance.  Since GPS is such an important tool, attacks against users of the system is a 
given where the most well known are jamming and spoofing.  Jamming involves 
mechanical or electronic means to block or interfere with communications.  In spoofing, 
attackers feed false information to receivers causing positional errors.  Spoofing is 
considered more deceitful since the victim is typically unaware of the attack. 
 Simulation is a helpful tool in understanding the way a system works without the 
heavy resource burden that affects other testing means.  SEAS is a combat simulation 
tool that models mission level activities.  We briefly describe a SEAS model built by 
SMC/XR [16] to analyze PNT performance in an urban canyon environment.  In Chapter 
4, we use this model to explore further the effects of GPS jamming and spoofing for this 
scenario.  Our analysis uses DOE to allow an efficient and effective way to test across an 
entire operating space.  In addition, we develop predictive equations and response 
surfaces from the simulation outputs retrieved from our experiments to provide a better 
understanding of how jamming and spoofing effect a PNT system. 
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III.  Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
SEAS is used to model the effects of jamming and spoofing on military operations.  
The ability to repeat and to explore a large number of different scenarios within an 
experimental design helps to find adequate results; this is a benefit that a simulation 
provides.  SMC/XR models a scenario that uses SEAS, which depicts a recovery mission 
by a SOF team using GPS [16].  We start with this model and vary selected input 
parameters to characterize a degradation in PNT performance due to jamming and 
spoofing effects.  A number of output statistics are collected as responses for the detailed 
study.   
3.2 Background 
SMC/XR, the SEAS model managers along with SAIC and ExoAnalytic 
Solutions presented a study at the Military Operations Research Society Symposium 
(MORSS) in 2009 [16].  The focus area captured in their study is the urban canyon 
environment.  This environment is marred by GPS gaps such as tall buildings and indoor 
locations.  The measures of performance (MOP) used as factors were developed from 
STRATCOM PNT Joint Capabilities Document and Functional Solutions Analysis and 
AFSPC Space Force Enhancement FY08 Mission Area Plan [17].  The three MOPs 
pulled from these documents are availability (assured access to PNT in any condition or 
environment), accuracy (conformance between a measured and a true PNT parameter), 
and timeliness (determine if PNT need is met within user defined time parameter) [16].  
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The blue goal in the scenario is to recover a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) from 
terrorists (red force) located in a target building.  The simulation unfolds with SOF team 
(blue forces) in the target building, recovering the WMD, and maneuvering to the 
extraction point.  PNT is used to navigate and avoid red force and local police.  The 
model behavior is gleaned from the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory Instructions, 
the Army Infantryman Input, and historical operations [18].  Major results from the study 
are “time lost correlates linearly with the availability of navigation sources, there is a 
knee in the mission success curve as availability passes 70%, and a distinct floor and 
shelf indicate that the availability of PNT potentially doubles mission success.”  [16] 
3.3 Measures of Effectiveness  
 A key piece of constructing the model involved developing measures of effect 
(MOE) selected from the Joint Staff’s Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) [19].  These 
MOEs are percent of friendly causalities, friendly forces movement delays in hours, and 
time to seize objectives.  For this study, we use multiple MOEs to capture degradation of 
the PNT system, which are time to mission completion, number of blue team killed, 
number of engagements, and number of GPS minutes lost. 
3.4 Model Behavior 
 The model focuses on a location in the Middle East between a blue force and a 
red force.  The blue force is made up of Air Force, Navy, and Army units.  The red force 
is made up of the civilians, police, and red military.  A screen shot of the model running 
is shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  Initial Phase of SEAS Scenario 
 The Air Force hierarchy, shown in Figure 5, consists of Predators, Global Hawks, 
and CV-22s.  In this scenario, they provide no offensive capability.  The remotely piloted 
aircrafts (RPAs) only deliver sensor and communication ability that highlights and 
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distinguishes red forces.  The CV-22 delivers and picks up blue forces with a constant 
evacuation time.  The Navy unit is a carrier with its mission to deploy and receive the Air 
Force’s helicopter.  [16] 
  
Figure 5.  Blue Hierarchy 
 The Army consists of squad leaders and soldiers.  The squad leader is a solider 
with the ability to issue commands.  There are 50 soldiers in the SOF team with no more 
than four groups at one time.  The soldier is armed with M-16s, night vision, PNT device, 
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blue tracking, and a radio.  A soldier does not engage the enemy unless fired upon, but 
when engaged, continues engagement until all enemies are killed, enemies flee, or until 
an order to retreat is given.  The blue unit ignores civilians and avoids the police force.  
The max range of sight for a blue force member is 200 meters.  Movement speed is 
variable and only on foot.  The max speed is 5.25 mph.  When a soldier is killed, the 
nearest soldier carries the dead soldier.  There is no delay if one soldier is carried, but if 
two soldiers are being carried then the speed of the soldier is reduced by 25%.  [16] 
There are 31 GPS units assigned to the blue force.  For this scenario, each unit is 
available.  GPS units follow actual unclassified orbits but do not model any signal traffic.  
The blue GPS unit under SOF team represents a GPS receiver and simply counts the 
number of satellites visible to the SOF team every time step.  PNT system performance 
and degradation is captured through use of the timeliness, accuracy, and availability.  [16] 
The red military has six platoons housing multiple soldiers each.  Each soldier is 
armed with a radio, night vision, and a rifle.  Trucks move soldiers to a combat area.  
There are six trucks with 11 soldiers per truck.  Forces can join to create larger forces.  
When retreating, red soldiers retreat as a group, always in the opposite direction of the 
SOF team.  The red soldiers gather information through police chatter, although the 
groups are not in collusion.  There is an initial lag time of 30 minutes from the first police 
call to when red soldiers move from their base.  When traveling in trucks max speed is 45 
mph.  When traveling on foot max speed is 5.25 mph.  Their max sight range is 200 
meters.  [16] 
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The police force has six stations each housing multiple police officers.  Each 
officer has a radio and a pistol.  There are five police officers per station.  Police are on 
scheduled regular patrols within a vicinity of their assigned police station.  They do not 
engage unless attacked.  For this scenario, if fired upon, the police run away.  Their max 
speed on foot is 5 mph, on motorcycle is 50 mph, and in station wagon is 50 mph.  Their 
max sight range is 50 meters.  [16] 
The civilians are non-offensive units that are only located downtown.  At the start 
of the mission, there are 20 civilians on the street.  A random counter adds more civilians 
the longer the campaign goes along, where 20 more civilians are added each hour.  If 
engaged, civilians run in random directions.  There is a 50% chance they call the police, 
where the location information takes 5 minutes to enter police chatter.  Tactical 
Programming Language (TPL) for this logic is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.  Civilian Protocol 
 The scenario follows the outline shown in Figure 7 and discussed below.  The 
blue forces are deployed to the drop off location.  The special operations forces (SOF) 
team then makes its way to the building housing the WMD.  The SOF team clears the 
building and recovers the WMD.  No SOF team or enemy forces will enter a building 
once the WMD is recovered.  WMD recovery begins the evacuation phase. 
3.5 Engagement Criteria 
 There are three unique engagement criteria during the scenario.  During the 
“Enemy Fights” criteria, the red soldiers always engage the SOF team.  During an attack, 
if needed the red units wait for reinforcements.  If at any point the enemy military force 
does not outnumber the SOF team at least 3 to 1, then the red soldiers disengage and 
retreat.  This engagement criterion is the “Enemy Runs Away” and is triggered by the 
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SOF team killing at least 50% of the red soldiers.  The enemy forces always shadow the 
SOF team until reinforcements have arrived.  The last criterion is when the SOF team 
retreats.  This occurs when the red force kills greater than 50% of the SOF team.  The 
SOF team never fully leaves as it still keeps it mission of recovering and delivering the 
WMD. 
3.6 Evacuation Criteria 
 The evacuation point is where the CV-22 picks up and recovers the WMD and 
teams.  At this location, there can be no more than 3 to 1 red units on location or there 
can be no pick up.  The CV-22 could come under heavy fire and evacuation will not be 
possible.  The CV-22 evacuation delay time is constant and its PNT is not degraded.  
There are two defined evacuation points in the model where the SOF team moves 
towards the closest from route taken which varies with engagements and other factors. 
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Figure 7.  Urban Operations Vignette [16] 
3.7 Selected Measures 
For the purpose of this model, the three inputs are availability and accuracy, 
which are measures for a jamming capability, and timeliness, which is a measure for 
spoofing.  This study looks at these variables to assess what jamming and spoofing does 
to mission success.  Does jamming have a bigger effect on mission success or is spoofing 
the more problematic attack?  What is the response depending on the overall modeled 
area for jamming and spoofing?  These questions are what the study looks to answer.  
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Although availability and accuracy are grouped to describe the jamming capability, all 
three variables are systematically changed during the experiment. 
The inputs are continuous variables.  Accuracy is conformance between a 
measured and a true PNT parameter, where the position error measured in meters, 
ranging from one to 100, where one is the most accurate.  Availability is the assured 
access to PNT in any condition or environment ranging from zero to one, where one is 
fully available.  Timeliness, the time to recover a lost signal, is measured in seconds, 
ranging from five to 360, where five is the best timeliness for our scenario. 
Responses are mission success, time to mission success, number of blue team 
killed, number of engagements, and amount of time with no satellite GPS signal.  The 
responses are discrete or continuous.  Time to mission success is a continuous response 
measured in minutes, with the determination of it being accepted for analysis based on if 
there is a mission success.  Number of blue team killed and number of engagements are 
discrete values.  Amount of time with no satellite GPS signal is a continuous response in 
minutes. 
3.8 Constant Measures 
 The other parameters varied in the SMC study [16] are held constant for our study 
to focus on effects of jamming and spoofing at different levels for our selected responses.  
For our scenario there are two predators used to help the blue forces identify red forces.  
The police do not join the fight.  There is a 3-minute delay by blue forces when initially 
dropped off at the starting location. 
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3.9 Analysis Approach 
To understand fully any effect of each factor, a DOE is employed.  The DOE is a 
5k design, where the response is measured at combination of unique levels for each of the 
k factors.  An empirical model is created and tested for model parameter significance by 
p-values while confirming assumptions such as constant variance and normality.  A 
response surface is then made comparing variables to one or multiple responses. 
3.10 Verification and Validation 
 Confirmatory runs are used to verify that the predictions received from the 
experiment are valid.  Many times an estimated optimal setting is used to verify whether 
the response surface or prediction formula meets the goal of the experiment.  Since this is 
a simulation, the environment of the experiment is the same and at least three runs are 
normally sufficient.  In addition, consultation with subject matter experts (SMEs) and 
comparison to past data are used for verification and validation.  
3.11 Summary 
We describe an SMC/XR scenario built with SEAS where PNT is highly stressed as a 
SOF team recovers a WMD from a red force using GPS.  Our study uses this scenario to 
understand and capture the degradation of the PNT system due to spoofing and jamming.  
We model spoofing and jamming by varying availability, accuracy, and timeliness 
parameters as factors in our DOE to characterize the system.  The scenario uses a blue 
force made up of Air Force, Navy, and Army units against a red force comprised of 
civilians, police, and a red military force.  GPS units used by blue forces in the model do 
 25 
 
not use actual GPS signals, but count the number of satellites visible to the SOF team 
every time step.  The DOE discussed in Chapter 4 produces the data used to create a 
prediction model and response surfaces for comparing variables effect on responses.  An 
in-depth look at two replications provides additional insight and serves as an additional 
verification and validation tool. 
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IV.  Analysis 
4.1 Overview 
 This chapter outlines the analysis approach used and provides the results of the 
DOE.  The chapter examines four responses: time to complete the mission, SOF team 
members killed, number of engagements, and the number of minutes the GPS signal is 
lost.  Where applicable, confirmatory runs and response surfaces are used to validate the 
prediction models.  This chapter also compares the two jamming components, 
availability, and accuracy, to the spoofing component of timeliness. 
4.2 Setting up the DOE 
Initially a setup of the variable space is needed to focus the experiment.  The goal 
of the experiment is to see meaningful change in the design.  Setting all of the variables at 
high points would not produce a meaningful design, as there would not be a better 
understanding of the reduction in PNT.  Likewise setting all of the variables at the low 
points would only serve to show what going into a combat zone blind would entail.  
Since GPS has become integrated in many aspects of both civilian and military products, 
setting all variables at the low point would not provide much knowledge for this 
experiment.  A 10% reduction is taken from the high and low points to show what the 
variation in PNT produces.  To understand better this variation, replication runs are 
included in the experiment.  The more test points collected is always better.  Even though 
there is not a monetary expense associated with this simulation, time is a concern.  On 
average for this simulation, the SEAS simulation tool takes an hour to do 50 runs, with 
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runs experiencing heavier losses taking longer.  We set a budget of 1000 runs for the 
study.  To balance the amount of design points with replications, the level of the DOE 
was considered.  A 43 full factorial model requires 64 runs, while a 53 full factorial model 
requires 125 runs.  Increasing the number of levels gives a better understanding of the 
complete design space.  To maximize time and design points a decision between a 43 with 
15 replications or a 53 with 8 replications is made.  Ultimately, the ability to understand 
better the design space is the reason that the 53 design is chosen. 
4.3 Design 
Table 1 shows the 53 design space in engineering units along with the coded units.  
The coded space maps the engineering units to the range -1 to 1.  This yields orthogonal 
columns, which means all the elements in the column sum to zero. 
Table 1.  Design Space 
 
 
Accuracy Availability Timeliness
10 0.1 36
30 0.3 108
50 0.5 180
70 0.7 252
90 0.9 324
1 -1 1
0.5 -0.5 0.5
0 0 0
-0.5 0.5 -0.5
-1 1 -1
Coded Space
Engineering Values
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4.4 Results Introduction 
After running the simulation, the experimental results contain 1000 runs, which is 
a five level DOE with three factors and eight replications.  Eighty of these runs caused 
erratic results in the simulation.  Low availability appears to be the cause of distress.  
These resulted in high completion times and abnormally high minutes lost for the GPS 
signal.  These runs were removed since the results do not give accurate readings at the 
affected levels.  Overall, 46 design points are affected.  These design points have between 
three and seven replications.  The remaining 920 runs make up the data analyzed.   
The average and standard deviation rates realized by each factor, accuracy, 
availability, and timeliness, at each level are recorded in Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4, 
respectively. 
Table 2.  Average and Standard Deviation Accuracy Results 
 
10 30 50 70 90
Time
262.29
± 170.90
382.53
± 227.73
388.977
± 234.33
401.81
± 248.95
401.76
± 227.57
Blue Killed
32.82
± 6.07
33.41
± 5.98
32.07
± 5.63
32.63
± 5.94
33.67
± 5.87
Number of Engagements
11.41
± 2.24
11.80
1.88
11.91
± 1.81
12.01
± 1.92
11.92
± 1.70
Minutes GPS Signal Lost
173.20
± 167.06
295.26
± 225.62
305.28
± 230.88
318.85
± 247.98
317.49
± 227.56
Accuracy
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Table 3.  Average and Standard Deviation Availability Results 
 
Table 4.  Average and Standard Deviation Timeliness Results 
 
Based on these results, an initial conjecture is made concerning the effect of 
individual factors on each response.  Looking at the Accuracy factor, the time the SOF 
team runs the mission and the average minutes that GPS signal is lost appear to be 
affected by the accuracy factor.  For the Availability factor, time and minutes GPS signal 
lost might again appear to be affected.  Time and minutes GPS signal lost also appear to 
be affected by the timeliness factor.  
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
Time
393.10
± 238.26
389.61
± 232.47
375.98
± 228.94
345.72
± 227.57
324.51
± 210.04
Blue Killed
32.87
± 5.63
33.32
± 6.12
32.66
± 5.56
32.91
± 6.35
32.83
± 5.93
Number of Engagements
11.80
± 1.71
11.98
± 1.91
11.70
± 1.87
11.79
±2.21
11.74
± 1.93
Minutes GPS Signal Lost
308.16
± 235.80
304.07
± 230.67
288.72
± 228.10
259.41
± 226.77
242.06
± 210.06
Availability
36 108 180 252 324
Time
171.35
± 91.14
300.49
± 190.58
380.09
± 206.35
471.91
± 207.50
554.30
± 219.44
Blue Killed
33.00
± 6.00
33.36
± 6.18
32.91
± 5.91
32.39
± 5.86
32.83
± 5.57
Number of Engagements
10.97
± 2.10
11.57
± 1.99
12.02
± 1.71
12.38
± 1.70
12.25
± 1.74
Minutes GPS Signal Lost
72.00
± 69.08
216.17
± 180.22
297.96
± 200.80
392.13
± 205.06
472.85
± 218.92
Timeliness
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Although the tables provide a general understanding of the effect of individual 
factors on each response, the standard deviation on for each measurement is large.  This 
is due to the wide range for each measurement.  One level of a factor is also accounting 
for all levels of the other two factors.  To get a better view, confidence intervals of each 
factor split by the other factors are plotted against the two responses that appear to be 
affected, time and minutes GPS signal lost in Figure 8 - Figure 13.  All confidence 
intervals are constructed independently at the 95% level.  In each figure, the best settings 
for all factors are in the lower right corner and worst settings in upper left corner.  
Looking at the Figure 8 - Figure 10, a high level Timeliness generates a lower time no 
matter what setting the other factors are set at.  Such a blanket statement cannot be said 
about the other two factors.  The same holds true for Figure 11 - Figure 13, where a high 
level of timeliness produces a lower amount of lost GPS signal minutes, no matter the 
settings of the other two factors.  Since timeliness corresponds directly to spoofing in our 
study, these initial results indicate a larger impact from spoofing than jamming.  To 
understand fully the effect of each factor a regression analysis and a response surface 
analysis is conducted. 
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Figure 8.  Time Confidence Interval (Timeliness Base) 
Figure 8 shows much less effect on timeliness when both availability and 
accuracy are at the highest levels.  With any degradation in availability or accuracy, 
timeliness shows significant increases going from low to high levels. 
 32 
 
 
Figure 9.  Time Confidence Interval (Availability Base) 
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In Figure 9, we see the most effect across levels of availability when accuracy is 
at the best level and timeliness at the worst. 
 
Figure 10.  Time Confidence Interval (Accuracy Base) 
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Figure 10 shows a significant increase in time with an accuracy increase from 10 
– 30 meters at degraded levels of timeliness and availability.  There also seems to be a 
significant drop in time when accuracy is at its highest level and timeliness is greater than 
108 seconds.  
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Figure 11.  GPS Signal Minutes Lost Confidence Interval (Timeliness Base) 
Just as in Figure 8, there is little effect across levels of timeliness in Figure 11 at 
the best setting for availability and accuracy.  With any degradation in availability or 
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accuracy, we see a significant increase in GPS signal minutes lost with increases in 
timeliness. 
 
Figure 12.  GPS Signal Minutes Lost Confidence Interval (Availability Base) 
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Figure 12 shows little effect across levels of availability at the best setting for 
timeliness and accuracy.  With any degradation in timeliness or accuracy, we see a 
significant increase in GPS signal minutes lost with increases in timeliness. 
 
 
Figure 13.  GPS Signal Minutes Lost Confidence Interval (Accuracy Base) 
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Figure 13 results show a significant increase in GPS signal minutes lost with an 
accuracy increase from 10 – 30 meters at degraded levels of timeliness and availability.  
There also seems to be a significant drop in GPS signal minutes lost when accuracy is at 
its highest level and timeliness is greater than 108 seconds. 
4.5 Time Response 
We initially construct a model with time as the response for the full factorial 
design.  Looking at the residual by predicted plot in Figure 14, a transformation made 
sense since the plot took on a funneling shape and not a random even spread across a 
median.  A Box-Cox Transformations analysis shown in Figure 15, is performed and a 
value of -0.2 is pulled from the analysis.  This value being close to zero is interpreted as a 
Log transformation on the response variable. 
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Figure 14.  Initial Time Residual by Predicted Plot 
 
Figure 15.  Initial Time Box-Cox Transformations Analysis 
Using the transformation and stepwise analysis, we first notice potential signs for 
higher order terms with the Actual by Predicted plot in Figure 16.  The predicted model, 
shown in Figure 17, contains higher order terms, as indicated from Figure 16.  The lack 
of fit test along with the response surface shows the model contains higher order terms.  
Model adequacy checking indicates that a constant variance and normality assumption 
are both reasonable.  
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Figure 16.  Log (Time) Actual by Predicted Plot 
 
Figure 17.  Log (Time) Parameter Estimates 
 
The goal is to minimize the amount of time the SOF team needs to complete the 
mission, so referring to Figure 18, setting all variables to their highest levels (Accuracy, 
Availability, Timeliness) = (10, 0.9, 36) results in a time within the interval {70.3718, 
85.8437} 95% of the time. 
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Figure 18.  Time Prediction Profiler 
To validate this response five validation runs are made, with all factors at their 
high levels for all runs.  Table 5 lists the results.  Across the entire run, the range is 82.95 
to 88.55 with an overall average of 85.44.  This lines up with the prediction model.  
Notice also in Figure 18, we see a slight decrease in mission time for improvements in all 
three factors. 
Table 5.  Time Validation Runs 
 
 
Run Time Average
1 88.55
2 82.95
3 85.6
4 83.2
5 86.9
85.44
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A response surface helps to understand better how the variables influence the 
response.  Figure 19 is the response surface for Accuracy and Availability using the Time 
response variable.  The surface indicates a stationary ridge.  This is great news for 
understanding the model, as there is a line maximum of 431 for the design space of 
accuracy and availability.  In essence, there is little change in the response as we move 
along the line maximum.  The minimum point for this design space is 123 at the 
maximum levels for both variables.  Figure 20 and Figure 21 represent the response 
surfaces for accuracy and timeliness as well as timeliness and availability.  These two are 
both rising ridges, where there is essentially a rising slope within the design space.  For 
both models, the maximum value is at the low levels for both design variables and the 
high design variables produce the minimum value being 83 and 113 minutes, 
respectively. 
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Figure 19.  Time Accuracy vs Availability Response Surface 
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Figure 20.  Time Accuracy vs Timeliness Response Surface 
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Figure 21.  Time Timeliness vs Availability Response Surface 
4.6 Blue Team Killed Response 
When examining the blue killed response, no “good” model is apparent.  After 
going through all model types, the best model in terms of R2, ANOVA p-value, and 
parameter fits is Figure 22.  Looking at the Actual by Predicted Plot, the values appear in 
vertical line.  Also looking at the averages of blue killed by factors, Table 2 – Table 4, the 
factors look have little to no effect.  Statistically, PNT has no effect on the number of 
SOF team killed during the mission. 
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Figure 22.  Blue Killed Summary of Fit 
  
Figure 23.  Blue Killed Parameter Estimates 
4.7 Number of Engagements Response 
Examining the number of engagements, Figure 25 provides the predicted model.  
The model contains only accuracy and timeliness, as availability was not a significant 
factor in the modeling of the number of engagements.  Referring to Figure 24, the R2 as 
well as the Radj2  are extremely low.  This indicates a poor fit of the actual data to the 
predicted model.  No further analysis for this response is conducted. 
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Figure 24.  Number of Engagements Summary of Fit 
 
Figure 25.  Number of Engagements Parameter Estimates 
4.8 Minutes GPS Signal Lost Response 
We initially construct a model with GPS signal minutes lost as the response for 
our full factorial design.  Looking at the residual by predicted plot, Figure 26, a 
transformation made sense since the plot took on a funneling shape and not a random 
spread across a median.  A Box-Cox Transformations analysis, Figure 27, is performed 
and a value of zero is recommended.  This value is interpreted as a Log transformation on 
the response variable. 
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Figure 26.  Initial GPS Minutes Lost Residual by Predicted Plot 
 
Figure 27.  Initial GPS Minutes Lost Box-Cox Transformations Analysis 
 
Figure 28.  Log (GPS Minutes Lost) Actual by Predicted Plot 
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Figure 29.  Log (GPS Minutes Lost) Parameter Estimates 
Using the transformation and stepwise analysis, we first notice potential signs for 
higher order terms with the Actual by Predicted plot in Figure 28.  The predicted model, 
provided in Figure 29, contains higher order terms, as indicated in Figure 28.  The lack of 
fit test along with the response surface indicates the model contains higher order terms.  
Model adequacy checking indicates that a constant variance and normality assumption 
are both reasonable.   
The goal is to minimize the amount of GPS Minutes Lost during the SOF team’s 
mission.  Referring to Figure 30, setting all variables to their highest levels (Accuracy, 
Availability, Timeliness) = (10, 0.9, 36) results in a minutes lost within the interval 
{12.3917, 16.2348} 95% of the time. 
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Figure 30.  GPS Minutes Lost Prediction Profiler 
To validate this response five validation runs are made, with all factors at their 
high levels for all runs.  Table 6 lists the results.  Across the entire run, the range is 10.85 
to 14.5 with an overall average of 12.48.  Although the three lowest runs are below the 
predicted range, the average falls within the prediction model. 
Table 6.  GPS Minutes Lost Validation Runs 
 
 
Run Time Average
1 11.75
2 14.5
3 13.4
4 10.85
5 11.9
12.48
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A response surface helps to understand better the variables effect on the response.  
Figure 31 is the response surface of Accuracy and Availability for the GPS Minutes Lost 
response variable.  The surface forms a saddle point.  The minimum point for this design 
space is 38 at the maximum levels for both variables and the maximum point is at 401 
minutes lost.  Figure 32 and Figure 33 represent the response surfaces for timeliness and 
accuracy as well as timeliness and availability, respectively.  Both surfaces indicate a 
maximum point within the design space.  In Figure 32, the maximum value is within the 
Accuracy range {45, 85} and within the Timeliness range {252, 324} producing, a value 
of 555 minutes lost, and the high design variables produce the minimum value being 14 
minutes lost.  In Figure 33, the maximum value is within the Availability range {0.1, 
0.55} and within the Timeliness range {230, 324} producing, a value of 582 minutes lost, 
and the high design variables produce the minimum value being 26 minutes lost. 
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Figure 31.  GPS Signal Minutes Lost Accuracy vs Availability Response Surface 
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Figure 32.  GPS Signal Minutes Lost Accuracy vs Timeliness Response Surface 
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Figure 33.  GPS Signal Minutes Lost Timeliness vs Availability Response Surface 
 
4.9 Individual Run 
We decided to look at two additional individual runs to gain more insight and to 
validate further.  The first run depicted in Figure 34, is a mission totaling 72.8 minutes 
with only two engagements, 15 blue units killed, and 32.45 minutes from lost GPS signal.  
For this run, the factors are high (1) for accuracy, medium-high (0.5) for availability, and 
medium-high (0.5) for timeliness.  The SOF team recovered successfully the WMD 
before being detected and engaged.  During the run, PNT issues did not occur until after 
recovering of the WMD, but lasted until the end of the mission. 
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Figure 34.  Individual Run #226 
To check the other spectrum, we examined a mission where PNT was stressed.  
Figure 35 shows a low (-1) accuracy setting, a medium (0) availability setting, and a low 
(-1) timeliness setting.  This produced a time of 872.55 minutes with 11 engagements, 44 
blue members killed, and 819.65 minutes lost from GPS signal.  PNT issues occurred 
throughout the run from start to end.  Unlike the previous run, the SOF team took fire 
well before recovering the WMD.  Figure 36 depicts the beginning of the mission.  It 
shows that PNT issues began about 15 minutes into the mission with the first engagement 
occurring a little after 20 minutes from drop-off. 
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Figure 35.  Individual Run #984 (Entire) 
 
Figure 36.  Individual Run #984 (0-60 minutes) 
4.10 Overall Findings 
This research employed a 53 full factorial model with eight replications for a 1000 
run data set.  Eighty of these runs caused erratic results in the simulation and were 
removed, however all 125 data points had at least three replications.  The results clearly 
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show PNT has a significant effect on mission statistics.  Of the MOEs studied, blue 
members killed and number of engagements did not produce a significant predictive 
model, which means that the three MOPs used for this research did not significantly 
affect these two effective measurements. 
The MOE, time to complete the mission, produced a significant predictive model.  
This model includes higher order terms due to the exponential spike in the response as 
PNT began to degrade.  This model contains all three MOPs.  Spoofing, represented by 
the performance measurement, timeliness, maintains the highest individual coefficient in 
the model.  A higher coefficient means that a given value influences the model more than 
a smaller coefficient.  When combining the jamming effects and looking at the 
percentage added to the model, jamming has a slight 53% to 47% edge over spoofing.  
Jamming has a higher effect on the timing measurement. 
The other significant model produced by the model, number of minutes GPS signal 
lost, also included higher order terms due to the exponential spike in the actual data.  This 
model also contains all three MOPs.  As with the timing measurement, timeliness again 
had the highest single effect on the model.  When combining the jamming effects, 
jamming for a second time has the slight edge of 54% to 46% over spoofing.  Jamming 
once more has the higher effect on the total GPS signal minutes lost. 
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V.  Conclusions 
5.1 Overview 
This thesis uses a model presented at MORSS by SMC/XR to study the effects of 
PNT in an urban canyon environment.  The overall mission involves a blue SOF team 
recovering a WMD from a red military force that includes local police and civilians with 
the help of GPS units.  Three MOPs are studied, availability and accuracy representing 
jamming, and timeliness representing spoofing.  The MOEs to understand the effects of 
PNT are time to complete the mission, blue forces killed, number of engagements, and 
the number of minutes lost by the GPS signal. 
This chapter summarizes the results of the analysis conducted using simulation, 
DOE, and RSM statistical tools.  In addition, recommendations for improvement and 
suggestions for future research are included. 
5.2 Analysis Conclusions 
The analysis clearly shows that PNT can directly and significantly influence a 
mission.  Of the response variables monitored, the SOF team members killed and 
numbers of engagements responses were not statistically significant for our selected PNT 
MOEs.  The prediction models included higher order terms due to the exponential spike 
in the responses as PNT began to degrade. 
 With the timing of the mission, all input variables were included in the model 
with timeliness having the biggest coefficient in the model.  This held true looking at the 
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individual variable averages across their levels as timeliness had the biggest and most 
definite spike, although combined jamming, both availability and accuracy, had the 
greater effect.  The SOF team had the lowest mission time when all factors were at their 
highest level.  Confirmatory runs validated the prediction interval. 
GPS signal minutes lost is related to all factors.  The prediction model includes all 
three inputs at varying degrees.  The coefficient for timeliness once again had the highest 
coefficient in the model with the combined jamming having the greater effect.  The GPS 
receiver lost the fewest minutes when all factors were at their highest levels.  
Confirmatory runs validated the prediction interval. 
Within the two prediction models, timeliness is the largest coefficient for all 
models.  Timeliness, representing the spoofing capability, has the largest single influence 
for these two responses in this design.  When combining all terms in the model, jamming, 
which includes both availability and accuracy terms, has the larger effect slightly over 
spoofing for both models. 
An effective predictive model was established for two of the MOEs, time and lost 
number of GPS signal minutes.  The models produced response surfaces that generated a 
better understanding of the variables and their relationship to the response.  For the time 
response, a stationary ridge was produced for the factors accuracy and availability.  This 
tells us that no matter the level of availability, if accuracy is between 30 to 70 meters, 
there is little effect on the maximum time produced.  The other variations, timeliness vs 
accuracy, and timeliness vs availability produce a rising ridge where essentially there is a 
slope, the higher the level of the factor, the lower the time. 
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For the GPS signal minutes lost, a saddle point is produced for accuracy and 
availability.  The saddle pint is very shallow, really more of a stationary ridge.  For the 
accuracy factor between 30 to 70 meters produces a high minute lost no matter the 
availability.  The other variations, timeliness vs accuracy, and timeliness vs availability 
produce a rising ridge where essentially there is a slope, the higher the level of the factor, 
the lower the minutes lost. 
The individual runs provided additional insight from selected replications and 
cemented the predictive models established.  Number of engagements and blue killed did 
not seem to factor.  With both responses, time and minutes lost, the higher the levels of 
all factors, the better these two responses were. 
5.3 Recommendations for Improvements 
As with any type of research and analysis, more data is paramount to better 
information.  This research employed an unbiased 53 model with eight replications at 
most design points.  With a larger model and more replications, a more detailed view of 
the model space could be achieved.  This may yield a better understanding of the number 
of blue members killed as well as the number of engagements.  In addition, a better 
model could be established for the timing and GPS minutes lost measurements.  
Continuing with the data improvements, the eighty runs lost could be ran again to better 
understand the design space. 
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5.4 Future Work 
Many potential future routes are available to continue this research.  The police and 
civilians in the scenario are only used as eyes for the red military.  A DOE could be 
employed to see what effects a combat engaged police force would have in the scenario. 
Another approach could be looking at different MOEs to model.  Additional MOEs 
could be if the SOF team is detected prior to exiting the building housing the WMD, was 
there a change to the evacuation plan, what is the chosen evacuation plan, and if the 
mission was a success or failure. 
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